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THE CURSE OF BLACK GOLD: HOW MARITIME OIL 
RESERVES CAN SINK INTERNATIONAL 
NEGOTIATIONS 
DOUGLAS R. BROOKING∗ 
When one hears of oil and gas development today, the debates in the new 
media also seem to focus on the certain drilling techniques, pipeline 
placements, and the roll of “foreign oil.” The often-forgotten area of oil and 
gas development, an area of tremendous potential, lies offshore, under the 
sea. Subsea petroleum development has played a huge role in the industry, 
and the control of oil and gas fields beneath the sea surface remains vital for 
both domestic and international interests of almost every nation. Every 
nation and oil and gas company desires efficient, safe, environmentally 
mindful, and profitable oil and gas production. To effectively achieve this 
goal, control of the petroleum molecules, or the right to proceeds of their 
development, must be accurately and definitively determined, lest the 
industry fall into chaos. Despite the international community’s best efforts, 
maritime boarder disputes still exist in certain areas around the world, 
impeding the development of oil and gas.  
This paper explores the development of maritime law, first throughout 
history, and then in relation to the access to and control of subsea oil and 
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gas plays. This paper additionally highlights certain disputed territorial 
claims around the world and provides reasons why dispute resolution has 
been successful or unsuccessful in those regions. This paper suggests the 
role that private oil and gas companies could play in dispute resolutions 
regarding these disputed fields, citing both the positive and negatives that a 
non-governmental, international body can bring to the dispute resolution 
arena. Although not the perfect solution to the difficulties of settling 
international maritime disputes, private, commercial entities may offer one 
other method to find lasting peace in certain maritime boarder disputes.  
Law of the Sea 
Much if not all of history has been defined by the dominate power of the 
sea. Power over and control of the sea equated a control of the market. The 
evolution of the market economy and the global market, thanks again to 
maritime navigation, shrunk the world and brought greater disagreement 
regarding the most powerful trading network on the planet. Access to and 
rights over (and under) the Sea became vital to every nation, without which 
they may lose out on the next great innovation or discovery.1 To establish 
parity, or at least attempt to, the various nations of the world called upon 
the United Nations to establish some sort of law for the sea and a system to 
settle disputes.  
From the first moments of maritime expansion, control of the sea was 
limited to those nations with the will and economic power to successfully 
navigate the globe.2 Colonial expansion brought world wars, and those 
world wars brought increased interest to the control of the seas. Unilateral 
and bipartisan agreements no longer satisfied the insatiable thirst for 
control, and perhaps more importantly, the exclusive control of the large 
swaths of open waters from competing nations, both economically and 
militarily. This created a problem on the high seas where the rights to 
control traditionally ended within inline of the shore or that nations' vessel.3 
The Cold War and the proliferation of the world’s superpowers enabled 
certain seafaring nations to operate, control, use, and destroy maritime 
natural resources at an alarming rate.4 Quickly, nations began to claim large 
                                                                                                                 
 1. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Historical Perspective, 
UNITED NATIONS (2012), http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_ 
historical_perspective.htm (examining multiple examples of maritime disagreement 
regarding access to natural resources).  
 2. Id. 
 3. U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., 1515th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515 (Nov. 1, 1967).  
 4. Id. at 3-5.  
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sections of the sea for themselves—rights above and below the surface. The 
open sea, the area far beyond the shoreline and the direct control of nations, 
contains the largest wealth of natural resources located above, within, and 
below the sea, and the international free-for-all became too great for the 
globe to sustain, so the United Nations set out to resolve the disagreements. 
Finally, in 1973, the United Nations convened to create some sort of 
lasting solution to the problem regarding the control of the sea.5 It took 
nearly a decade of diplomacy, deal making, and problem solving to finally 
formulate a solution.6 The Law of the Sea resolution established many 
guidelines relating to navigation, economic development, and national 
defense at sea.7 The United States, for several reasons, chose not to adopt 
the Law of the Sea as resolved by the United Nations.8 This meant, at least 
formally, the United States did not abide by the same maritime standards 
and laws as the 150 other nations that joined the Law of the Sea Resolution.  
The Law of the Sea covers a broad range of topics in the hopes to 
remedy issues before they arise and to establish a system to resolve all other 
disputes. This comment specifically focuses on the economic concerns 
resolved by the Law of the Sea, as these resolutions govern most directly 
the acquisition of and interest in particular natural resource deposits below 
the ocean surface. The continued growth of global demand for oil and 
natural gas has led to increased exploration of potential petroleum fields 
below the sea’s surface. Nations and multinational corporations (MNCs) 
have a significant interest in acquiring the rights to develop these fields and 
market the resources around the world. To successfully develop and market 
the field, the developer needs to first establish the nation with the rights to 
those natural resources and then acquire the rights to produce those natural 
resources.  
History of Maritime Law  
As in every area of law, the Law of the Sea developed out of the 
historical significance of maritime law and the modern necessity to preserve 
and maintain peace and sovereignty. As soon as mankind took to the high 
                                                                                                                 
 5. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Historical Perspective, 
supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter Law of the 
Sea].  
 8. Id.  
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seas, systems of laws and regulations began to pop up, thus planting the 
seeds that grew into modern maritime law.   
The first documented code of admiralty law, at least in the West, 
originated in the Mediterranean under the great sea power of Ancient 
Greece, Rhodes.9 The Rhodian Sea Laws set forth uniform regulations by 
which the sailors, captains, port masters, and empires were to relate with 
one another while conducting their sailing operations.10 Over the years, the 
transitions of power from empire to empire altered and added to the 
Rhodian Sea Laws as best served the particular empire; with the growth of 
sailing technology, so expanded trade into the far corners of the 
Mediterranean and Europe.11 The various codes and customs that developed 
around the world focused specifically on the law governing maritime 
commerce. The maritime powers fought, diplomatically and militarily, for 
the control of shipping routes, rights to explore, and access to new markets, 
as it became clear to the powers that “the financial power base was shifting, 
at least to some degree, from land-based commerce to maritime 
commerce.”12 Regardless of the interests sought, the seafaring nations of 
the world knew that they needed to move in the direction of unifying their 
efforts to maintain equitable and predictable legal systems about the sea.  
The increased calls for uniformity in maritime laws resulted in perhaps 
the first maritime legal conferences of their kind in Antwerp in 1885 and in 
Brussels in 1888, each with the goal of creating uniform laws for all 
mariners.13 Not long after these conferences, the nations of Europe met 
again in Brussels in 1897 to establish a similar set of codes to provide some 
semblance of uniformity on both sides of the Atlantic.14 These two 
conferences and the legal minds that bore the results eventually formed the 
Comité Maritime International (CMI), with the stated goal to become a 
non-governmental organization to promote the unification of all aspects of 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Robert D. Benedict, The Historical Position of the Rhodian Law, 18 YALE L.J. 223 
(1909). 
 10. Gordon W. Paulsen, An Historical Overview of the Development of Uniformity in 
International Maritime Law, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1065 (1983). 
 11. Id. at 1071-74. 
 12. Id. at 1075. 
 13. Albert Lilar & Carlo van den Bosch, LE COMITÉ MARITIME INTERNATIONAL 1897-
1972 6, (Comité Maritime Int’l 1972), http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/History/ 
LILAR-VAN%20DEN%20BOSCH-Le%20Comit%C3%A9%20Maritime%20International. 
pdf.  
 14. Id. at 12.  
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maritime law.15 From its constitution, two "of these words recognize the 
past history of maritime law, its present dilemma, and its future. The first is 
non-governmental, indicating its professional rather than political 
foundation. The second is, of course, uniformity, a word used by 
governments as often as it is not practiced by them."16 The CMI and its 
predecessor within the ranks of the United Nations, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), both focused on the commerce conducted on 
the surface of the seas and remained more or less silent regarding the 
bountiful resources located beneath the sea floor. 
Importance of Sub Sea Petroleum  
The oil and natural gas industry predates the American Civil War when 
Edwin Drake successfully drilled a well and extracted oil in Titusville, 
Pennsylvania.17 The demand for electric power around the world drove 
engineers, pioneers, and innovators to develop new and improved 
techniques to access and discover petroleum reserves.18 Prospectors quickly 
bought leases all over the country, which drove some companies to follow 
in the footsteps of the explorers in the Age of Exploration and look to the 
sea. As early as the 1890s, oil companies began to drill offshore, though 
their operations resembled little more than immobile wooden docks 
connected to the shore by gangplanks.19 Moveable drilling barges entered 
operation in the 1930s in Louisiana, although in inshore marshes rather than 
on the open sea.20 Within the decade, innovative oil companies sought to go 
beyond inshore marshes to the open oceans. In 1938, two oil companies 
drilled the first freestanding well about thirteen miles from the Louisiana 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Comité Maritime International (CMI) Const. art. I, http://www.comitemaritime.org/ 
part-1-general/0,2736,13632,00.html. 
 16. See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 1084 (emphasis in the original). 
 17. Parke A. Dickey, The First Oil Well, Oil Industry Centennial: Journal of Petroleum 
Technology, Jan 1959, 23. Drake’s well came because of coal gas, developed in England in 
the 18th century but which could not sustain the need for worldwide power. Id. Drake’s well 
did not produce the first hydrocarbons extracted from the earth to be used as fuel on a large 
scale. Id. 
 18. Id. at 26. 
 19. The History of Offshore Oil and Gas in the United States (Long Version), National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 1, 
https://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_documents/DWH_IR/reports/HistoryofDrillingStaffPaper22.p
df. The Commission notes that this paper is subject to change but is useful for expanded 
knowledge beyond the special constraints of the official report. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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coast.21 This first well began the research and development of petroleum 
located beneath the ocean. Soon, technology and the desire to control the 
rights to different petroleum plays drove companies and nationalized 
petroleum industries further from shore and into conflict with one another.  
The U.S. offers an excellent starting point to examine the issue of 
establishing the rights to develop oil and gas plays under navigable 
waterways. The principle of Federalism, the divide of power between the 
many states and the Federal government, has continuously effected the 
legal landscape of the United States since its founding. Following the 
Second World War, the ability to reinvest in offshore exploration caused 
President Truman to proclaim for the federal government the exclusive 
rights to the petroleum under the United States Continental Shelf.22 Almost 
immediately, states with offshore oil production ignored this 
proclamation.23 The Supreme Court resolved the conflict in 1947 when it 
denied the California’s claim to the three-mile tract of ocean beyond its 
shores and granted the federal government the exclusive ability to grant 
rights to the minerals in that tract.24  Congress codified a clarification to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in that the “Submerged Lands Act,” which 
granted all right and title to the respective states in land beneath navigable 
water ways within three miles of the state’s shoreline.25 All other rights and 
titles outside this three-mile range remained with the federal government, 
and permits granted in this land from the various states must be refiled with 
the federal government.26 With the passage of the Submerged Lands Act, 
the United States established its own system by which private individuals 
and corporations could seek rights to explore and extract minerals offshore. 
Regardless of the respective states’ opinions of the Supreme Court 
decisions and subsequent legislative clarification, the uniformity in the law 
of right and title to subsea minerals brought some stability to negotiations 
for the right to drill and develop offshore. While the United States may 
have experienced relative stability in subsea petroleum negotiations, 
international dispute resolution regarding maritime law still posed many 
difficulties. 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Id. at 2.  
 22. Id. at 4. 
 23. Id.  
 24. United States. v. State of California, 332 U.S. 19, 40-41 (1947); see also United 
States. v. State of Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. State of Texas, 339 U.S. 
707 (1950).  
 25. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (2016). 
 26. Id. 
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Dispute Resolution Prior to the Law of the Sea 
The modern landscape in offshore petroleum rights and the players 
involved in this fight constitute the largest obstacles for lawyers, diplomats, 
and executives to peacefully and profitably produce subsea oil and gas 
reserves. Three main parties play roles in the development of subsea 
petroleum assets: the individual sovereign nations, one or more 
international governmental organizations, and the petroleum company, 
whether private or nationalized. The difficulty in deciding the proper 
method of dispute resolution stems directly from the different positions of 
these three distinct parties, specifically their bargaining power in relation to 
one another and their power to impact international relations on a global 
scale. Before discussing the modern dispute resolution case studies, it is 
important to understand international dispute resolution prior to the 
establishment of the Law of the Sea.  
The simplest and most efficient route to take would require these actors, 
specifically state actors, to negotiate their respective differences and result 
in a state treaty.27 Each party would propose solutions with little if any 
input from outside actors not a party to the dispute.28 The parties (there are 
usually two, but can be multilateral) each put forward positions then work 
through their respective diplomats and negotiators to reach a solution, 
usually landing somewhere in the middle of the two proposals.29 
Negotiations allow a certain amount of flexibility for the parties to 
maneuver through tenuous issues not just limited to international legal 
disputes.30 Negotiation, however, has its limits, the most notable and 
troublesome being that the entire nature of the resolution hinges on the will 
of the parties involved.31 If one party wants to win each and every point 
without conceding anything, the other party that may be more willing to 
find mutual points of agreements can be left marooned at the negotiation 
table. In situations in which one party either refuses to fairly negotiate or 
simply refuses to abide by the terms of the negotiation, more forceful 
mechanisms of peaceful dispute resolution can be implemented.  
                                                                                                                 
 27. SIR HUMPHREY WALDOCK, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 77 
(Europa Publications: London 1972).  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 80.  Opposing parties use litigation to avoid going before courts everyday, in 
the United States and internationally.  Negotiations allow parties to remain in control of their 
own deal making before the necessity of a court or arbitrator to resolve the mutual issues. 
 31. Id.  
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Occasionally, to get certain actors to work with one another, the parties 
submit to international arbitration. The model definition for international 
arbitrations has remained mostly unchanged from that of The Hague 
Convention of 1899: “International arbitration has for its object the 
settlement of difference between states by judges of their own choice, and 
on the basis of a respect for the law.”32 The two provisions of this definition 
provide both the strength and weakness of arbitration. The clause, “by 
judges of their own choice,” allows for the parties by agreement to appoint 
a particular arbitrator to decide disputes in which they cannot agree. 
Inherently, however, this implies that the parties can first agree on the 
arbitrator and then that they will follow the decision thereof.33 Second, the 
clause, “on the basis of a respect for the law,” empowers or rather 
“requires” that parties accept the decision of the arbitration as binding and 
abide by it as if it were some other international body of law.34 One word in 
the clause can commandeer the entire arbitration process. The definition 
and interpretation of “the law” has perplexed philosophers, politicians, 
lawyers, and judges for millennia, and each state actor likely will have their 
own definition. The inability to agree upon a definition of the “law” and the 
inability to enforce arbitration agreements caused the international 
arbitrations model to suffer.35 
The international community attempted to ensure more effective 
enforcement of arbitrations in the mid-twentieth century. Thus, the 
International Law Commission, in 1953, proposed the adoption of a general 
understanding about the goals, procedures, and requirements of arbitration 
in the international setting.36 The Commission approached the issue from  
“the principle of non-frustration”; that I, by the principle that an 
agreement to arbitrate involves an international obligation and 
that states having once entered into such an obligation are bound 
not only to take all necessary steps to allow the arbitration to 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. at 101 (citing British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 91, 1889-99, p. 970; Scott, 
Hague Court Reports, 1st Series, 1916, p. xxxii). 
 33. Id. at 102. 
 34. WALDOCK, supra note 27. 
 35. Id. at 107 (examining the ways that different countries legal definitions prolonged 
the debates to establish a uniform international arbitration mechanism). 
 36. Id. at 106. 
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proceed, but also to refrain from any action which would impede 
or frustrate it.37 
This idea sought to fix the problem by allowing parties to back out of 
agreements and use arbitration as a dispute resolution method. The 
important hook for this change, however, came in the obligation to 
arbitrate; if the country opts to arbitrate, failure to arbitrate then adversely 
affects their position and continues regardless of their representative 
presence.38 Should parties fail to “take the necessary steps,” then the 
compromise would remain enforceable, despite the actions of the 
noncompliant party.39 Although this amendment to international 
arbitrational procedures might help with certain troublesome nations, some 
disputes would continue to the final level of international dispute 
resolution.  
That final step in the international dispute resolution process comes in 
the form of international courts. The international courts are the final 
decision makers regarding international law and help to define the idea of 
law in the international community.40 The international courts combine the 
other two forms of dispute resolution with an added note of objectivity from 
the international community. The entire basis and existence of these courts 
comes from the philosophy of international law.41  
Regardless of a state’s definition of or respect for the law, countries and 
citizens understand that courts represent the idea of the rule of law. The 
establishment of an international court first demonstrated to the global 
community that “the law” flourished and remained important to all the 
members of the global society.42 The second theory behind the court 
undoubtedly sprung from the common law judicial philosophy.43 The 
presence of an international court symbolizes the fact that the law itself 
“tends to be more objective and autonomous but may be developed by the 
Court in its jurisprudence.”44 The United Nations sought to establish the 
court so that international players would understand the system of 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 106. (citing the commentary on the draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure, 
A/CN. 4/92, April 1955). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 128. 
 41. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1946 I.C.J. Acts & Docs., art. 1, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2. 
 42. WALDOCK, supra note 27, at 130. 
 43. U.N. Charter art 94, ¶ 1. 
 44. WALDOCK, supra note 27, at 131. 
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accountability and the method through which to file a grievance in the 
international arena.45 Perhaps the most philosophically based method of 
dispute resolution––the International Court of Justice––still lacked the 
necessary enforcement mechanism missing in both negotiation and 
arbitration, outside of an appeal to the Security Council.46  
All these different forms could be applied to a variety of international 
disputes, including those specifically regarding issues at sea. However, the 
growth of the global economy and the increased technological abilities to 
access the resources of the oceans caused the international community to 
revisit international law, specifically maritime law. The traditional forms of 
law no longer sufficed to meet the needs of the increased legal interest in 
the subsea resources.47 With increased interest and economic potential 
beneath the sea came increased tension between nations to have the rights 
to primary access to these minerals and other resources.48 The increased 
reward or profit potential made it even harder for the international 
community to bring parties to the table to cooperate and inevitably bargain 
for exchange. Thus, the United Nations decided to create a new body of law 
that would join the nations together. The law crafted eventually became 
known as the Law of the Sea.  
Importance of the Law of the Sea 
Up through the adoption of the Law of the Sea, the only real control of 
the sea and the rights thereto came through the traditional forms of 
international law: treaties and customs.49 Treaties, in their own regard, still 
occupy perhaps the best option for parties wishing to benefit and convert 
oceanic resources. However, even treaties have their shortcomings both 
through a lack of enforcement mechanisms and the tenuous ability of 
parties to give rights away.50 Customary international law creates perhaps 
an even greater enigma for international scholars to decipher. The primary 
issue with customary law stems from the need for “relatively uniform and 
consistent state practice regarding a particular matter.”51 For nations with 
                                                                                                                 
 45. U.N. Charter, supra note 43, at ¶ 2. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Gabriele Goettsche-Wanli, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
Multilateral Diplomacy at Work, U.N. CHRONICLE (Dec. 2014), https://unchronicle.un.org/ 
article/united-nations-convention-law-sea-multilateral-diplomacy-work. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Paulsen, supra note 10, at 1066. 
 50. SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (THOMSON WEST 2006).  
 51. Id. 
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extensive diplomatic or economic ties, customary practices might very well 
be able to govern most disputes. Given their mutual proximity to and 
reliance on the North Sea, the International Court of Justice looked to the 
customs of interaction between the United Kingdom and Norway to settle a 
dispute.52 The reliance upon custom, rather than the establishment of some 
new international law, better suited the two nations. However, not all states 
have a mutually amicable or interested customary law like the UK and 
Norway.53 Many states have openly adverse goals regarding one another’s 
customs in the region or even around the globe.54  
To appropriately manage the vast resources contained in the oceans and 
the common inability of nations to see eye-to-eye, the international 
community needs a clear system to determine economic rights and dispute 
resolution mechanisms. Therefore, one of the most important interests 
established by the Law of the Sea came in the form of each (coastal) 
nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).55 A particular nation’s EEZ 
allows that state to “assume[ ] jurisdiction over the exploration and 
exploitation of marine resources in its adjacent section of the continental 
shelf.”56 This area extends out 200 nautical miles from the shoreline.57 This 
exclusive control grants the respective states immense power in the ability 
to develop, exploit, or market the resources contained in that particular 
zone.58 Even the 200-nautical-mile distinction creates problems between the 
nations, as Libya and Malta fought (in court) to establish how this mileage 
is measured.59 Although these 200 miles might contain countless resources, 
these maritime resources may not be sedentary or may extend beyond these 
200 miles. It is outside the EEZs that the Law of the Sea becomes truly 
important.  
The Law of the Sea makes one incredibly important distinction for the 
EEZ from other interests a nation might possess in the sea. Islands extend 
the EEZ’s of nations, but that does not mean that all islands claimed by a 
nation established an EEZ. The Law of the Sea importantly notes that 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116, 139, (Dec. 18). 
 53. WALDOCK, supra note 27, at 133. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Law of the Sea, supra note 7, at Part IV, art. 48. 
 56. DEPT. FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INFORMATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS: STATISTICS 
DIVISION, GLOSSARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL STATISTICS, (FEB. 1997), http://unstats.un.org/ 
unsd/publication/SeriesF/SeriesF_67E.pdf. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 34 (June 3). 
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“[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their 
own shall have no exclusive economic zone.”60 With the development of 
modern engineering and the ability to construct artificial islands for any 
number of uses, this provision will become even more important.  
Most––if not all––legal systems desire to establish a system in which 
parties, both foreign and domestic, can transact business with some sort of 
clarity. Although the transactions may differ depending on the 
sophistication of legal systems or the unfortunate corruption of government 
officials, states and private players desire a predictable system in which to 
conduct business. Acquiring the rights to access the resources of one EEZ 
remains mostly unchanged by the Law of the Sea: simply contract with the 
controlling coastal nation.61 However, as so often happens, contracts fail, 
parties become dissatisfied with the terms, or perhaps the most detrimental 
option, the parties to the contract never possessed the rights to the economic 
interest in the first place. “Although the Convention that emerged . . . 
accepts extensive coastal state control over broad coastal zones, it limits the 
broadest unilateral claims of sovereignty over these zones and guarantees 
navigational freedoms to maritime powers.”62 The limitation of broad 
economic claims sought to secure the interests of parties with lesser 
bargaining power over maritime resources and traditional international 
subordinates ravaged from centuries of imperialism.63 
The Law of the Sea creates a series of mechanisms with which to settle 
international disputes. The first and most important requirement of the Law 
of the Sea is a peaceful resolution of the dispute, which takes precedent 
over all other requirements of dispute resolution.64 When states cannot 
come to a peaceful resolution on their own, the Law of the Sea lays out a 
plan through which the disputes may be resolved. First, the parties must 
exchange their respective views regarding the particular dispute, and in the 
absence of a decision, parties must agree to non-binding recommendations 
from a panel of conciliators.65 Should this solution fail, the states must 
submit to one of four different fora to issue binding declaration: the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Law of the Sea, supra note 7, at art. 121.  
 61. Id. at art. 56. 
 62. John E. Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32 CORNELL INT'L 
L.J. 109, 114 (1998).  
 63. See id. 
 64. Law of the Sea, supra note 7, at art. 280. 
 65. Id. at art. 283-84. 
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Justice, a general arbitral tribunal, or a special arbitral tribunal.66  
Whichever fora is used, the decision is binding upon the parties to the 
dispute resolution.67  
This extensive dispute resolution apparatus can aid many nations in the 
resolutions of disputes but raises two important problems with the Law of 
the Sea. First, that the Law of the Sea remains limited to those nations that 
have ratified the Convention, which excludes the United States.68 Second, 
despite the “binding nature” of the Law of the Sea resolutions, enforcement 
mechanisms remain wholly inadequate in their ability to ensure the party-
states abide by the decisions.  
Non-Party Members 
The United States foreign policy toes the line of a careful dichotomy 
between the isolationist nation of the early twentieth century to the sole 
superpower following the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Domestic 
political opinion controls much of the United States’ foreign policy 
decisions, with most Americans desiring to keep power at home rather than 
submitting to foreign control. President Clinton submitted the Law of the 
Sea to Congress in 1994, whereupon Congress failed to vote for nearly a 
decade and eventually rejected the Law of the Sea, citing that it “would 
constitute the most egregious transfer of American sovereignty, wealth, and 
power to the U.N. since the founding of that ‘world body.’”69 Despite the 
America’s failure to adopt the Law of the Sea, like so many of her allies 
and rivals, the United States still abides by many of its provisions. But the 
failure to become a party to the Convention causes two layers of regulation 
for other countries operating in United States waters; they must abide by the 
Law of the Sea and the US laws governing the sea.70 In addition, the United 
States enters binding agreements with party members regularly, often 
concerning the petroleum interests around the world. Perhaps the most 
notable example comes out of the negotiations regarding the Arctic 
resources. 
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The Arctic region represents perhaps the most untapped area of resources 
left on the planet. In 2008, the United States estimated that the Arctic 
contained thirteen percent of the undiscovered oil and thirty percent of the 
undiscovered gas, with the majority of this potential discovery occurring in 
offshore plays.71 This vast potential of resources, in addition to issues such 
as polar ice, climate change, and control of shipping routes, demanded that 
Arctic nations take action to protect their interests. Different nations began 
taking bold steps, including shows of economic and military force, as well 
as diplomatic appeals to the U.N.72 With the United States not being a party 
to the Law of the Sea and the other Arctic nations vying for control of the 
vast resources, the eight Arctic nations––with the addition of the indigenous 
peoples of the Arctic regions––sought to establish an independent accord to 
help govern Arctic disputes.73 These countries adopted The Ottawa 
Declaration, which declared that the member states would seek cooperative 
solutions and work together to establish proper access to the Arctic 
resources.74 The Arctic Council is more of a joint operating agreement 
between the nations rather than any sort of international legal framework 
under which disputes might be settled like the Law of the Sea. However, 
this accord constitutes another step in the correct direction regarding 
dispute resolution at sea, as it specifically denotes the desire to work 
together for the future development of Arctic resources.75  
The United States has also found other ways to govern their Southern 
maritime interests without resorting to international government bodies for 
resolution. The United States and Mexico entered a treaty through which 
the two nations might equitably divide the resources of the Gulf of Mexico. 
A system of peace and reliability of action in the Gulf requires the two 
dominant nations surrounding the Gulf of Mexico to establish a mechanism 
through which to tap into these resources. To do this, the two nations 
entered into a treaty dividing the Gulf on a latitudinal basis, which granted 
each nation sole right to develop the resources below the surface of the sea 
                                                                                                                 
 71. 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in 
the Arctic, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., (July 23, 2008, 1:00 PM), https://archive.usgs.gov/ 
archive/sites/www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp-ID=1980.html. 
 72. See, e.g., Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security 
Implications of Global Warming, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2 (Mar. – Apr. 2008) (highlighting 
Russia’s strategic bomber flyovers, Canada’s Arctic military expenditures, and Denmark’s 
appeal to the UN under the Law of the Sea). 
 73. Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Sep. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 
1382. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1388. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss6/4
2017] Maritime Oil Reserves Can Sink International Negotiations 665 
 
 
on their respective side.76 This bilateral treaty, with the addition of various 
treaties with the other Caribbean nations, enabled the United States to 
secure its maritime interest without being a party to the Law of the Sea.77  
Other nations have likewise found ways to resolve their differences 
about subsea petroleum rights outside of an appeal to the Law of the Sea. 
The Loran-Mantee natural gas field crosses the maritime boundary between 
Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago. For the interests to be properly 
divided, the two nations negotiated for more than a decade to establish 
ownership.78The field contained an estimated ten trillion cubic foot (Tcf) of 
natural gas sandstone reservoirs that spanned the area around the two 
nations borders.79 Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago allowed for various 
international gas companies to research and explore the gas contained 
within the field and, more particularly, which nations controlled the right to 
produce or sell the rights to production.80  
The Loran-Mantee agreement recognizes two particularly important 
issues with the development of subsea petroleum rights. First, the extensive 
research done demonstrates the importance of definitively establishing 
ownership interests prior to development for each field discovery to prevent 
future disputes. Second, it demonstrates the role that corporate entities can 
play in the establishment of rights. Development of subsea petroleum 
involves significant investment in terms of money and time. As exemplified 
in the decade and a half long negotiation between Venezuela and Trinidad 
and Tobago, the research and development of these significant resources 
can often be too great for individual nations to take on. For this reason, 
countries may choose to exchange the rights to develop the petroleum in 
exchange for the oil and gas companies to put in the upfront costs of 
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establishing and gathering all the information about the different petroleum 
rights. Thus, oil and gas companies can play a very important role in 
dispute resolution schemes in future disputed territories. 
For every great triumph in hurdling the challenges of international 
negotiations, many petroleum fields remain contested around the world. 
Various economic, political, and military interests cause many nations to 
become embroiled in deadlock debates that can last for decades. And even 
upon the resolution one or multiple nations may not like the decision and 
thus refuse to abide by the decision of the particular dispute. 
Still other interests might be implicated in negotiations regarding a 
disputed oil and gas field. Control and ownership could implicate issue of 
national security or national pride dating back centuries. In addition to 
economic and political concerns, negotiation efforts might also get bogged 
down based on different countries international influence. Russia and Japan 
both possess formidable national economies with strong links to 
international markets. Even since its fall from superpower status, Russia 
still possesses an indisputable advantage in regards to international 
influence. And one such dispute between Russia and Japan dates back over 
fifty years to the dwindling days of World War II. 
Kuril Island Dispute 
The battle regarding territorial claims between Japan and Russia 
continued long after the guns of World War II fell silent in 1945. Despite a 
ceasefire, the Soviet Union (and its successor, Russia) and Japan failed to 
ever sign a formal peace treaty.81 One of the major issues holding up peace 
negotiation, both then and now, stems from the disputed control over the 
Kuril Islands.82 
The specific issue regarding the rights to economic explorations in the 
Kuril Islands (or “Northern Territories” to Japan) manifested themselves 
more importantly in the second half of the twentieth century.83 The Soviets 
invaded the islands as part of their effort in the Pacific theater following the 
surrender of Nazi Germany and held possession of them at the time of the 
Japanese surrender.84 The legal struggle regarding control stems from the 
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most recent international agreement regarding the Kuril Islands’ status: 
Japan agreed to renounce all right to the island, but the Soviet Union never 
signed the treaty.85 Despite the Soviet Union’s failure to sign the treaty, the 
Japanese revocation of all right to the island would seem to quiet the debate 
regarding control. However, the Cold War and the subsequent status of the 
United States as the sole superpower emerging from the early 1990s often 
forced politicians and international legal tacticians to resort to claims 
outside the legal framework.  
The breakdown of negotiations following the Soviet failure to sign the 
peace treaty at the end of World War II caused further disputes that 
expanded far outside the Kuril Islands. The politically charged nature of 
every dispute, anywhere in the world, throughout the Cold War caused 
every nation to fight desperately for control of certain areas and use threats, 
to garner support. When Japan and the United States argued for stronger 
Japanese interests in and rights to the development of the Kuril Islands, the 
Soviets responded by threating to block U.S. and Japanese fishing interests 
in the Northern Pacific and Arctic Oceans.86 The Cold War also posed the 
constant threat of military intervention in small localized conflicts as well 
as on the macro, thermonuclear scale. The breakup of the Soviet Union and 
the presence of a single superpower quieted some of the military tensions of 
the Cold War but left behind the economic battlegrounds from years past.  
The development of the subsea petroleum industry has only further 
perpetuated the claims of both nations for control of the islands. Current 
estimates claim that two fields occupy the disputed area with estimated 
reserves at one billion barrels of oil and 500 billion cubic meters of natural 
gas.87 Although some development has begun on the fields and foreign 
investment into the regions hydrocarbon development continues, the fact 
that disputes have not been completely finalized leaves any potential 
undertaking vulnerable.88 Private hydrocarbon development may well be at 
the mercy of potential nationalization efforts, such as those that 
nationalized BP’s assets in Libya in 1971.89 Any private oil and gas 
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company would want to ensure that their interests in the region would be 
well represented, but more importantly, well protected, lest their oil and gas 
assets suffer nationalization to Gazprom, as occurred in Libya.90 This is not 
to suggest that Gazprom would undertake such a measure, as Gazprom’s 
motives differ greatly from those of the Revolutionary Libyan government 
of the 1970s, but rather to suggest a frame work of protection for MNCs to 
protect their assets and insure stability of development. 
Nationalized Interests 
In the international oil and gas industry, the race to acquire petroleum 
rights and control the cornerstone of markets has two main participants: 
Multinational oil and gas corporations (ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, 
British Petroleum, etc.) and nationalized petroleum companies (Gazprom, 
Perotbas, China National Petroleum Corp., etc). In the race to dominate 
rights to reserves and production, the multinational corporations occupy a 
meager ten percent of the market share compared to nationalized companies 
controlling over seventy-five percent of the market.91 The nationalized 
companies profit from the ability to use public money to jumpstart the 
expansion and pressure private companies into selling off petroleum rights. 
Rather than allowing mineral owners to sell the rights to develop the 
minerals they control, nationalized oil and gas companies develop and 
control the minerals in the ground and after production for the claimed 
benefit of the entire country. For example, in 2006 to 2007 alone, Russia 
increased political pressure by revoking permits and pressuring sales to 
solidify Gazprom as the world’s largest producer of natural gas.92 The 
nationalized companies have another tool in addition to the ability of their 
respective governments to pressure private competitors: since these 
companies operate as an agency of the sovereign nation, they do not need to 
fight other companies for rights to take with the government. The 
tremendous potential for increased production and thus increased profit 
from offshore energy plays, can bring about increased tension regarding 
hydrocarbon recovery and disagreements regarding the dispute resolution 
mechanism most apt to work. 
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With the clear majority of oil and gas reserves controlled by nationalized 
companies, a deeper knowledge of these types of oil and gas companies 
will clarify the implications on disputed petroleum plays. The structure of 
nationalized industries, their control mechanisms, and the methodological 
basis for their founding will weigh heavily on any effort to broker some sort 
of cohesive, mutually beneficial deal regarding disputed oil and gas rights. 
Economics remains the main driving force behind the decision to 
nationalize the oil and gas industries in most countries. Nationalization 
allows the government to avoid hydrocarbon revenue sharing with private 
corporations93 This offers a two-fold benefit for the country. First, the 
country can acquire the entire revenue from its oil and gas industry and 
reinvest that money in the domestic oil industry or enter profit sharing 
agreements to develop international petroleum trade to market their 
products.94 Second, a nationalized industry’s control of the country’s oil 
and gas assets can be spun off as protection against foreign interests and 
exploitation of the country’s oil and gas resources.95 These two interests 
would become decisive during times of high oil and gas prices, as privately 
owned interests would allow for the money to leave the country with the 
actual oil, whereas a nationalized industry would keep the revenue at 
home.96  
Control of oil reserves also lends massive political power to countries in 
addition to the economic interests. Following the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 
and the subsequent oil embargo, nations around the world realized how they 
could assert control over other countries, both friend and foe, using national 
control of the oil industry.97 The twentieth Century saw an explosion in the 
demand for oil, especially in the developed world. The reliance on foreign 
oil, specifically by the United States, presented an opportunity for the 
nationalized industries to flex their muscles. Thus, since the 1970s, 
countries have advocated for “energy independence,” or being able to 
control their own destiny in regards to acquisition to adequate supply of 
energy.98 Perhaps the better term might be “energy diversification.”99 As a 
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large consumer nation, the United States cannot afford to put all their eggs 
in one OPEC-controlled basket again or risk the gas shortages following the 
embargo. Instead, the country has attempted to create a balance between 
imported hydrocarbons, hydrocarbons produced in North America, and 
renewable sources, to maintain good relations with OPEC nations while not 
allowing for too much vulnerability on the domestic consumer market.100 It 
is this control, however, that fully develops the one-two punch for 
nationalized petroleum companies at the negotiation table. 
When nationalized oil and gas companies come to the negotiation table, 
they bring with them these basic economic and political arguments that 
often overshadow any potential deal that might be brokered. When the 
ownership of the petroleum assets is undisputed, private parties negotiate 
for profit sharing measures in ways similar to the negotiation methods in 
the United States. In the United States, companies negotiate oil and gas 
leases with the private mineral interest owners or with surface owners to 
build pipelines or other midstream or downstream instillations.101 For 
nationalized interests, the private companies must negotiate with the 
government to access the minerals or rights to build the necessary 
infrastructure to access and develop the minerals. However, this paper is 
focused on the unique situation of negotiating for the rights to petroleum 
when two nations dispute the ownership of the petroleum. The method and 
outcome of negotiation will completely change, depending on whether any 
of the sovereign participants have nationalized oil and gas industries. To 
understand the consequences of the various implications of negotiating with 
industries more thoroughly, a brief highlight of one such country’s 
nationalized corporate structure may explain negotiation efforts. 
Perhaps the most well-known nationalized company is Gazprom, the 
Russian natural gas giant. Gazprom controls the world’s largest shares of 
natural gas reserves, with seventeen percent of the global reserves and 
seventy-two percent of the Russian gas reserves.102 The Russian Federation, 
either directly or indirectly (through shared ownership of other state 
controlled industries) owns more than fifty percent of Gazprom’s shares, 
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giving it the controlling interest of the gas giant.103 Gazprom’s corporate 
structure allows for corporate voting based on shareholder ownership, with 
the general operations run by the executives and Board of Directors.104 This 
corporate structure, with the majority ownership of shares by the Russian 
government, gives the Russian government the controlling interest in voting 
on business decisions and directors. So, for any negotiation with Gazprom, 
parties must inherently negotiate with the Russian government, lest any 
deal struck in the boardroom be overruled during the next shareholder 
voting cycle. As countries do not usually want to relinquish control of 
valuable assets or abandon any claim thereof, negotiation efforts with 
Gazprom may often place the outside private party with an uphill battle.  
In relation to the Kuril Islands dispute, Japan, an open-market oil and gas 
industry, lacking the singular power of an nationalized petroleum giant, 
would negotiate with Gazprom. Since the end of the Second World War, 
Japan has created one of the fastest growing and largely market-based 
economies in the world.105 Japan focused on privatizing ownership interests 
in all industries, with corporations and private citizens promoting, investing 
in, and receiving the benefits of the Japanese economy.106 This style of 
economy helped Japan to recover from a war-ravaged wasteland to the 
world’s second largest economy less than twenty years after the war.107 
However, with lack of public-sector control on the oil and gas industry, it 
lacks the same enforcement mechanisms possessed by a nationalized 
company. The lack of nationalization allows greater flexibility and ease of 
negotiation for similarly situated parties but often places private parties at a 
disadvantage with nationalized industries.108 When the nation’s only stake 
in the oil and gas industry comes from the tax revenue, as in a market 
economy, the government will not use their political influence to aid the oil 
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and gas negotiations in their favor to the same extent that a nationalized 
government would.  
The seemingly daily technological advancements made in the oil and gas 
industry have proliferated the number of fields that nations now can access. 
However, this ability can be limited by territorial disputes even more recent 
than the Kuril Islands dispute, a relatively calm dispute between nations.  
This calm does not exist today in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Beginning 
in 2009, several nations discovered natural gas plays under the 
Mediterranean.109 These particular plays represent more than just massive 
natural resource deposits with the potential for development. The Eastern 
Mediterranean and near East have been in almost a perpetual state of war 
for the better part of half a century. The discovery of natural gas plays has 
the potential to bring energy independence or stability to the region that has 
long quarreled over access to adequate energy sources.  
Eastern Mediterranean Gas Field Disputes 
Since the 2009 discoveries, various nations discovered numerous plays 
in their territorial waters. Israel discovered first the Tamar field, followed 
soon after by the Leviathan field, which experts estimate contain up to 
twenty-six TcF of natural gas.110 This amount of gas could allow for Israel 
to break their dependence on Middle Eastern hydrocarbons, a geopolitical 
splinter in the side of international peace in the region.111 Since the Israeli 
discoveries, a United States firm discovered the Aphrodite field in Cyprian 
territorial waters and an Italian company discovered the Zohr field in 
Egyptian waters.112 For these three nations, the fields represent the potential 
to meet some, if not all, of the nations’ natural gas needs, as well as the 
potential to become net exporters to the rest of Europe.113 The Zohr field 
also has the ability to potentially help cure an ongoing energy crisis within 
Egypt.114 These fields pose the possibility to potentially enable negotiations 
between hostile nations to be brokered if they can set aside disputes.  
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Since its founding in 1948, Israel and her neighbors have struggled to 
find peace. The root of the absence of regional peace is beyond the scope of 
this article. Specific to the natural gas plays in the Mediterranean, Lebanon 
and Israel dispute the maritime boarder between the two nations territorial 
waters.115 The dispute dates to the Israeli-Lebanese War in 1949 when the 
two nations disputed the armistice line that extended out into the Sea as the 
de facto maritime boarder.116 The territorial dispute does not directly 
concern the Tamar and Leviathan plays but rather impacts Lebanon’s 
claimed ability to develop unidentified fields in its own territorial waters.117 
The Israeli-Lebanese dispute is not the only roadblock stopping the 
development of the natural gas field of the Mediterranean. 
The island of Cyprus contains two separate governments, both of which 
claim to govern the entire island. The U.N. and the majority of the world 
governments formally recognizes the Republic of Cyprus as the 
government of the entire island, whereas Turkey alone recognizes the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as the true government.118 This divide 
has been at a stalemate since 1974, with United Nations peacekeeping 
forces attempting to forgo another outbreak of violence.119 Although the 
Republic of Cyprus might have international recognition, this does not 
inherently solve the problem for the disputed gas fields, as Turkey, one of 
the region’s major players, wants to forgo development “until a resolution 
to the ‘Cyprus problem’ is found.”120 The potential for the Aphrodite field 
to enable Cyprus to lower emissions through cleaner energy or simply sell 
the rights to development could play a dynamic and important role in so 
desired resolution to the Cyprus problem.  
The Zohr field, though important to the region, most likely will enable 
Egypt to solve or lessen certain domestic issues. Although important to the 
peace and prosperity in the region, the Egyptian development of the Zohr 
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field will likely play little to no role in international concerns, as Egypt will 
not likely export any of the produced natural gas.121 
The fragile state of the region, the deep-rooted conflicts between the 
countries, the ever-growing demand for energy, and the discovery of 
recoverable hydrocarbons prime the region for renewed efforts to settle 
these disputes. This paper does not seek to oversimplify the complex and 
nuanced art of international negotiations to end longstanding conflicts. 
Instead, this paper focuses on the ways that the oil and gas industry can be 
used as a carrot to aid negotiations and achieve the common goal of 
fulfilling every nation’s energy demands. All four of these international 
players have growing energy needs that, when not met, will rapidly bring 
parties to the table. The goal of these negotiations should be treaties that 
would ensure peaceful resolutions of conflicts and stability in the region.  
Because of the complexity of the Eastern Mediterranean dispute, an 
international mediator may be needed rather than a simple negotiation. This 
method has been unsuccessful in the past: the Clinton Administration 
brought the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus to the table without a resolution, and both the U.S. and France have 
led negotiations regarding the Israeli-Lebanese maritime dispute.122123 The 
region’s current energy demands and new ability for development presents 
a unique opportunity for international players to resolve these disputes.  
Israel discovered fields in its territorial waters that would allow it to 
meet, if not exceed, its energy demands while lowering carbon output by 
switching from oil production to natural gas production.124 The vast 
quantities of natural gas from these two fields would also enable Israel to 
export gas to its neighbors.125 However, the terror organization, Hezbollah, 
has threatened to attack Israeli gas platforms in the Mediterranean and, in 
terms of exportation, Israel’s most likely access to European trading 
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partners through pipeline transportation would bring about direct contact 
with the Cyprian conflict.126 
Cyprus heavily relies on imported hydrocarbons, so the ability to 
develop its own would be indispensable to energy diversification efforts.127 
Even if the island chose not to use its produced hydrocarbons, the ability to 
export such a huge amount of gas could boost the Cyprian economy.128 
However, Turkey wants the island to be unified before drilling these 
offshore gas plays in Cyprian waters or before Israel exports natural gas 
through the Cyprian zone.129 This dichotomy would encourage Israel to aid 
in the resolution of the Cyprus problem to access preferred European 
markets for its natural gas. Lebanon, although not directly dependent on the 
other nations, severely fell behind the rest of the world in the research 
regarding natural gas development.130 Even if Lebanon discovered natural 
gas in its territorial waters, its would need to contract with a production 
company to gain access, as Lebanon lacks such an ability.131 In total, the 
Eastern Mediterranean gas dispute contains five nations, an opposition 
government, a maritime boarder dispute, domestic supply problems, threats 
of terrorism, an impotent production ability, and this is all overshadowed by 
at least half a century of distrust and animosity.  
The delicate and intricate proceedings required to produce a lasting 
agreement between these nations regarding their access to these natural gas 
fields and the ability to economically development them requires skillful 
negotiation. Different governments have attempted to mediate areas of this 
dispute but have ultimately failed up to this point. Whenever one thinks of 
government negotiations, especially to readers in the United States or those 
well versed in the U.S. governmental system, one usually expects for 
government negotiations to be decided on political partisan lines. This can 
also happen in international negotiations: just as certain groups may 
influence decision making in domestic politics, the “control over political 
resources—the means by which one person can influence the behavior of 
other persons—is not distributed equally.”132 Likewise, certain nations 
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carry an unequal distribution of the power in international politics, which 
can negatively impact the perception of those state players as mediators, 
regardless of their legitimate neutrality. Therefore, a change in the type of 
international party chosen to mediate these negotiations might very well 
lead to a more successful resolution to this dispute.  
Corporate Led Negotiations 
Although corporations have a bad reputation in the public eye for their 
greed and money hoarding, this profit interest might help the negotiations 
move forward, especially regarding hydrocarbon development. Despite the 
massive value listed on many oil and gas company’s books, these 
companies operate in a state of constant commodity price changes and high 
operational costs to reap the rewards of hydrocarbon sale.133 Because of this 
relatively low profit margin for oil and gas companies, the potential to 
economically develop a field stands as the utmost concern, rather than 
international political games or the long term strategic goals of state actors 
in a region. This places privately held corporations in a prime position to 
find common ground between the state actors. The nationalized oil and gas 
companies function almost as an extension of the state actors, all within the 
framework of international law, without the worry of alternative goals in 
their role as mediators.  
Traditionally, a deal mediator facilitates the communication between the 
different parties.134 The goal of the mediator, as expressed in international 
law, “reconcile[es] the opposing claims and appeas[es] the feeling of 
resentment which may have arisen between the States at variance.”135 
Successful resolution of the disputes requires that the parties “disclose their 
strategic aims or other concerns in face-to-face encounters at the time of 
negotiating their initial agreement.”136 A state actor might have ulterior 
motives that may or may not come to the surface during initial agreements, 
and the history of prior state actors may weigh heavily on the minds of the 
parties to the negotiation. Ideally the mediator of the negotiations remains 
neutral but not indifferent to the outcome of the negotiations.137 Oil and gas 
companies can hold this position in a way state actors cannot: the 
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companies are interested in developing the natural gas fields for the mutual 
benefit of all parties, whereas the state actors look beyond this limited 
scope to wider geopolitical issues. For a region that broke from colonial 
powers less than a century ago, state influence over their dealings, no 
matter how innocent, might lead to a break down due to mistrust of 
motives.  
Although these negotiations are international negotiations between state 
actors, it boils down to a business negotiation between potential business 
partners or at minimum non-adversarial business participants. “Dealing 
with cultural differences remains the single most challenging task for the 
international business negotiator.”138 Direct cultural understanding requires 
an in-depth analysis of the multi-layered nature of culture and how those 
layers interact with, differ from, or mirror one another.139 The religious, 
political, economic, and philosophical makeups of these different nations 
differ greatly from one another, but they all share a common interest in the 
development of their natural gas fields. Corporate players stand in the best 
position to work through these differences, as they do not have their own 
political agenda but still stand to benefit from remedying the differences at 
the outset to avoid the potential meltdown of post-negotiation deals.140 The 
classic understanding of negotiation outcomes as being “win-win” or “win-
lose” oversimplify the actual outcomes of negotiations, especially in 
culturally diverse regions.141 Parties must understand that they will likely 
not accomplish everything that might be on their particular goal sheet.  
Oil and gas companies already take part in many negotiations around the 
globe. Specific to the Eastern Mediterranean, Lebanon already offered the 
chance for both Shell and Exxon to begin exploration of the natural gas in 
their territorial waters.142 Although this could stop at just the development 
of these assets, the relative lack of a natural gas market in Lebanon might 
require either Shell or Exxon to market to gas elsewhere in the world.143 
This could facilitate the states of the Eastern Mediterranean to come to the 
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table to resolve differences in this area more productively than state 
mediators have been able to in the past.  
MNC-led negotiations do have drawbacks for a few reasons. First, in 
disputes regarding fields contested by a nation with a nationalized oil and 
gas industry—such as the Kuril Islands dispute—a privately held oil and 
gas company such as an Exxon would have a lowered negotiating ability 
compared to the state-run energy company. Second, the issue of corporate 
“neutrality” might be at issue. Oil and gas companies have significant skin 
in the game regarding the environmental concerns of carbon output and the 
impact on global temperature data.144 The impact of human caused climate 
impact goes beyond the scope of this paper, but does importantly factor into 
the global perception or the willingness to accept corporate players as 
international mediators. Whatever the motivations for oil and gas 
companies environmental impacts, their primary interest in the Eastern 
Mediterranean would be to develop the fields in an environmentally safe 
manner while simultaneously easing international animosity between the 
states to ensure the economic viability of the development and prevent the 
waste of hydrocarbons.  
Allowing oil and gas companies to facilitate negotiations would also help 
move development in another fashion. The reliability and strength of 
international commerce relies on well negotiated business contracts, 
especially in the oil and gas industry.145 International contract law concerns 
those contracts that have chosen “‘between the laws of different States’, or 
‘affecting the interests of international trade.’”146 Contracts resolving the 
disputed oil and gas fields would significantly impact international trade 
and therefore significantly impact the attitudes of the negotiating parties. 
Contracts allow the negotiating parties to dictate where disputes will be 
resolved and what law will resolve the dispute.147 The decision regarding 
choice of law gives parties another level of flexibility and another 
bargaining chip to reach a potential deal.148 When brokering deals between 
multiple states and private companies, the forum and choice of law to 
govern disputes may be just as highly contested as the control of the subject 
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of the contract. The Law of the Sea has a unique feature that specifically 
may help give flexibility in establish the choice of law.  
Rather than immediately becoming subject to international resolution, 
parties may try to establish a means of contractual dispute resolution. 
However, if the state actors or the MNC remain unable to decide the forum 
or the law to apply, the Law of the Sea provides another option. Both state 
and non-state actors can petition for dispute resolution before the 
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.149 Thus a dispute that arose 
from the contracts for the development of the gas fields could be 
determined by this international tribunal even if the appealing party was not 
a state actor, i.e., an MNC. Most other international courts limit the ability 
to initiate cases to only state actors.150 The Law of the Sea does not limit, 
however, the ability of state actors to appeal disputes to other international 
tribunals.151 This increased ability of parties to dictate for themselves the 
method and forum of future dispute resolution might go a long way in 
resolving disputes before they come to a head.  
Despite the flexibility that international commercial contracts grant in 
choice of law and method of dispute resolution, international law in general 
can fall apart in one important way: enforcement. If parties fail or refuse to 
abide by the decisions of corporate-led mediation or even international 
tribunals, how should other parties respond? The dispute in the South China 
Sea presents an ideal reference point for discussion of enforcement 
difficulties.  
Enforcement of International Law 
World War II brought death and destruction on an unimaginable scale. 
The U.N. sought to remove the ability or incentive of nations to use armed 
conflict to settle differences.152 The Charter of the U.N. specifically limited 
the use of force to self-defense or when explicitly authorized by the 
Security Council.153 The Security Council may authorize members of the 
U.N. to use a variety of non-military enforcement mechanisms to enforce 
international law and the decisions of different tribunals made in 
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accordance with international law.154 If these economic, diplomatic, or 
political enforcement provisions fail or would be inadequate, the Security 
Council may authorize the use of military force to “maintain or restore 
international peace.”155 The Security Council has authorized such force few 
times since the establishment of the U.N. but usually only after an act of 
international violence or war has already taken place.156 It is therefore 
unlikely that the Security Council would authorize military force against a 
nation that simply fails to abide by a decision of an international tribunal.  
In relation to the Law of the Sea and the enforcement of international 
maritime law, the enforcement mechanisms suffer from decentralization.157 
Specifically, Article 94 empowers each state to control and have 
jurisdiction over the ships flying their flag.158 The divested enforcement 
mechanism creates a twofold problem for every nation whether they are a 
party to the Law of the Sea. First, states will be less likely to expend 
resources to enforce provisions that either negatively impact their interests 
or have negligible impacts thereon, and, second, the developing world lacks 
the resources to enforce international law provisions effectively.159 Both 
issues apply to disputes regarding rights to subsea petroleum as nations will 
be unlikely to amicably yield their perceived rights or the disputing nations 
may be unable to effectively act upon their rights due to economic or 
military poverty. Perhaps the most notable example of such difficulty in 
enforcement occurred in the international arbitration award in the South 
China Sea.  
The territorial disputes of the South China Sea is some of the most 
highly contested in the world today. Territorial claims to the area date back 
for hundreds if not thousands of years between many nations.160 Although 
these claims encompass far more than natural resources, control of fishing 
and petroleum rights constitute major bargaining points for different 
powers. As all the parties have formally ratified the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, an international arbitration took place to resolve the hotly 
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contested rights.161 The arbitration rejected the Republic of China's claims 
to much of the South China Sea, siding with the arguments of the 
Philippines.162 Almost immediately, Beijing announced their intentions to 
refuse to abide by the terms of the arbitration, claiming the award to be 
“invalid, null and void.”163 If China follows through with these threats to 
refuse to abide by the arbitrational ruling, what party sits in the best 
position to enforce the arbitrators decision?  
The Law of the Sea calls upon the flag carriers of the nation to enforce 
international law or the decision of the international tribunals.164 The 
Philippines lacks the necessary economic and political clout to adequately 
enforce the arbitrational award; China outranks the Philippines in terms of 
GDP by more than twenty to one.165 Lacking the individual capacity, the 
Philippines would likely turn to the mercy of the U.N. and the international 
community to aid in the enforcement of the arbitrational award. The volatile 
nature of the relationship between China and the rest of the world would 
likely lead to apprehension on the part of other state actors to put pressure 
on China to abide by an unfavorable decision. In addition, China’s position 
on the U.N. Security Council would prevent a definitive Security Council 
decision regarding any sanctions or force.  
Enforcement of international law has troubled state actors and IGOs 
regardless of how powerful the different countries in the situation might be. 
The best-case scenario would be for the international community to avoid 
the potential conflict all together. Global politics often drive parties to avoid 
making deals out of their own national pride or aspirations to assert regional 
dominance. Acquiescing to the demands of another nation, particularly a 
nation that has adverse claims, would cause a blow to national pride. Rather 
than definitively and publically settling a dispute regarding a maritime 
border or control of islands and resources in a region, countries could enter 
brokered agreements with commercial entities, as opposed to state actors, to 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Anders Corr, Enforce Law of the Sea Ruling: Stand with the Philippines Now, or 
Later Face China Alone, FORBES (Jul. 13, 2016, 6:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
anderscorr/2016/07/13/enforce-law-of-the-sea-ruling-stand-with-the-philippines-now-or-
later-face-china-alone/#705464d14ac1. 
 164. See König, supra note 157, at 3. 
 165. World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, (2015), https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html, https://www.cia.gov/library/publica 
tions/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (comparing the 2015 GDP numbers for the Republic 
of the Philippines and The People’s Republic of China). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
682 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 2 
  
 
use petroleum or the profits derived from the sale of petroleum to quietly 
settle disputes.  
The Kuril Islands, the South China Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean 
maritime disputes all share one commonality: historically rooted claims to 
the disputed area paired with distrust of the other party. The complication 
of international law does not allow for a one-size-fits-all model, but the use 
of a private, commercial entity, such as an oil and gas company, in the 
negotiation process may allow for a dispute to be resolved peacefully 
without the countries feeling as if they have lost. For this to work 
effectively and for parties to trust the oil and gas companies as mediators in 
their negotiations, these must begin prior to any submission to the disputes 
to an international tribunal. Once before a tribunal for definitive resolution 
per international law, then the commercial entity would have a vested 
interest in the nation with the more favorable trade policies receiving the 
arbitration award or court judgment. Oil and gas companies can be used to 
broker the agreements in such a way that neither country officially 
renounces claim to the disputed maritime border. 
All the countries mentioned in the above disputes have the desire to 
control a means to provide energy for their country and potentially export 
the oil and gas to help add money to the state coffers. Herein lies the 
potential solution to the dispute: energy and money. The oil and gas 
companies would have to find the right politicians from those two countries 
that would be willing to hear out the potential deal, but the produced 
petroleum and the money derived therefrom could be used as an alternative 
to a formal border-dispute claim. The oil and gas companies would act both 
as mediator and intermediary with the oil and gas and distribute it to the 
countries per the brokered deal. This solution sets aside all the other 
implications that accompany the maritime border disputes outside of 
control of natural resources but would grant parties the oil and gas or the 
revenue in exchange for quieting the dispute. These states need not formally 
renounce their claims regarding the maritime border, but rather quietly 
accept the revenue resulting from the deal. This proposed solution is not 
perfect and would suffer some difficulties, including lack of leverage and 
skepticism of corporations as international actors. Despite these shortfalls, 
the proposed solution is better than the current mechanisms and offers a 
greater potential of success.  
If corporate actors broker such deals, exchanging the rights to develop 
the petroleum plays in exchange for the quieting of the maritime border 
dispute, the corporate actors would lack leverage in the deal. Corporate 
entities want to ensure, as best as possible, that their corporate assets remain 
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secure and in their exclusive control, even during financial downturn and 
political unrest. To make sure that state actors do not simply renege on the 
agreement, the payouts in terms of resources or revenue percentage would 
have to be directed more toward the countries, creating a lower profit 
margin for the oil and gas companies. The companies could also work into 
the deal the requirement to seek resolution of any subsequent dispute in an 
international arbitration, but this leads to the next concern with the role that 
corporations play in the international arena. It is not so much the worry that 
private entities play a role that government entities can also play, but when 
private companies exercise “direct and very significant influence” over the 
development of international law.166 The concerns for many international 
legal scholars come from the prioritization of certain international contracts 
over that of later national law within the countries.167 However, the types of 
agreements suggested by this comment would not come from private 
entities asserting their control over national law or to directly influence or 
alter international law. Rather, in exchange for the right to drill and 
develop, these commercial entities could use financial gain to quiet 
international disputes and placate the potential violence or regional unrest 
caused by ongoing maritime disputes.  
Conclusion 
The Convention on the Law of the Sea brought countries together to join 
their mutual interests for a uniform international maritime law. Although 
the Law of the Sea helped to alleviate certain concerns regarding maritime 
law, certain disputes, due to their deep rooted historical and political 
differences, continue to proliferate despite the best efforts of the 
international community. Many of these areas contain massive amounts of 
untapped petroleum resources, so a resolution to these disputes would not 
only solve international diplomatic problems but also help certain countries 
economically. So far, mediations led by state actors or international 
governing bodies have not led to successful settlements of certain maritime 
disputes. Rather than doubling down on the efforts for state actors to 
resolve these disputes or force the parties into international court or 
arbitration, perhaps a new route could be attempted. 
Despite the global skeptical perception of corporate involvement in 
international legal affairs, private involvement could help the process. 
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Specifically, within the realm of oil and gas development, oil and gas 
companies could play the role of the meditator between state actors. Oil and 
gas companies share a common, limited goal with the state actors involved 
in these disputes: develop oil and gas in an economically and 
environmentally responsible manner. The commercial entities lack 
geopolitical opinions regarding state action—so long as that state action 
does not negatively impact their petroleum development—which places 
them in a good mediation position. The fungibility of money presents the 
potential for an alternative solution: rather than a signed treaty defining the 
borders, the two or more countries would silence their border disagreements 
in exchange for economically advantageous petroleum development. 
Nationalized oil and gas companies may present a problem for privately 
owned companies to mediate effectively, but nationalized and private oil 
and gas companies have worked together in development efforts. 
Successful commercial mediation would allow for the countries to develop 
their natural resources through a third party and settle a long-standing 
conflict without resorting to an international decision maker. Unsuccessful 
commercial mediation would leave the state actors in the same place 
regarding their disagreement as to their maritime boundaries and the oil and 
gas companies would have unsuccessfully used time and money to 
negotiate for the rights to drill—an all too common cost of doing business 
in the oil and gas community.  
This comment’s proposal does not claim to have uncovered the secret 
key to international dispute resolution. Rather than allowing the disputed 
control over huge deposits of subsea petroleum to sink negotiation efforts, 
this author’s suggestion is for internal parties to use those deposits to 
facilitate a solution to the disputes. Oil and gas companies can use the 
potential payout from the petroleum development to calm, or even facilitate 
a resolution to, the maritime disputes. This successful facilitation of 
resolution would dispel the need for the countries having to submit to an 
international decision making body in which one state wins and the other 
state loses. While not the perfect solution, the encouragement of oil and gas 
companies to serve as mediators in maritime disputes for the control of 
petroleum deposits could present a positive alternative to the current state 
of international dispute resolution. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss6/4
